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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SEYCHELLES

ISSUE:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING THE UNCLOS DEFINITION OF PIRACY ON SEYCHELLES
PIRACY PROSECUTIONS.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses the definition of piracy in international law as
incorporated into Seychelles law, and the implications for Seychelles piracy
prosecutions due to that approach.* Throughout the 20th Century world leaders
have treated piracy as if it were solely a crime of the past. As piratical
techniques have changed, this has repeatedly left important questions
regarding piracy unanswered because the conventions and writings which
have arisen, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”),1 have ignored piracy almost altogether.2 In fact the approach
taken by UNCLOS has not seriously been vetted since the early 20th century and
many of those same questions still remain unanswered.3 This memorandum will
explore and analyze the UNCLOS definition of piracy in comparison with parallel
Articles of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the

*

The Seychelles new piracy law incorporates the UNCLOS definition of piracy, rather than the broader provisions
of SUA. The Attorney General would like to know the implications for the Seychelles piracy prosecutions of this
approach.
1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
2

Barry H. Dubner, The Law of International Sea Piracy: Developments in International Law, Volume 2, 3-4 (1980).

3

Robin Geiss & Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The legal Framework for Counter-Piracy
Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. 38-41 (2011). (explaining that the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy
of 1932 produced an exhaustive list of piracy laws of the time and a report summarizing the doctrinal debate, and
that this research was the basis for the piracy articles included in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 1958, and that the text is largely unaltered in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982).

1

Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), and the implications for the prosecution of
international piracy in the courts of Seychelles.4
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The UNCLOS definition of piracy has been widely criticized for being
narrow, confusing and ambiguous and defense attorneys may seize on
this weakness to raise potentially successful defense strategies.
Significant problems have been noted regarding the language used in
the definition of piracy found in Article 101 of UNCLOS.5 Some of this is a result of
the failure of the drafters of conventions and writings to update the statutory
language in any material way since the early part of the 20th century. The
perception of piracy by those tasked with codifying international law in the 20th
Century seemed to be that piracy was a “historical phenomenon hardly in need
of elaborate codification.”6 Simply put, the laws do not contemplate acts of
piracy which include high speed vessels, night vision goggles and GPS systems.7
Some commentators have asserted that the law now in effect was “dated and
moot” when it was adopted.8 Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as; illegal
acts of violence, detention “or any act of depredation,” directed on the high
seas, committed for private ends, and involving only those actions undertaken
4

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), opened for
signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 22 (entered into force mar. 1, 1992).
5

Geiss, supra note 4, at 60.

6

Geiss, supra note 4, at 51.

7

Saeed Ahmed, High-Tech Pirates Are No Romantic Figures, CNN.com, April 29, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
CRIME/04/29/pirates/index.html.
8

Dubner, supra note 2, at 4.

2

by one ship against another ship. This language is very narrow9 and the
significant questions which have arisen have been largely ignored.10
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Elusive Definition of Piracy
Where there is a sea, there are pirates.

–Greek proverb11

The underlying problem regarding the definition of piracy is the failure of
State leaders to update international law to evolve along with the act of piracy
itself. It is possible that the concept of piracy first came into existence the
moment the second watercraft hit the ocean, but methods have evolved.
History tells us for certain that acts of piracy have been recorded as far back as
1400 B.C., and piracy has been a constant on the international scene ever
since.12 Unfortunately, until recently, very little effort had been engaged in
updating the legal framework regarding piracy.13 This failure to update the law
on piracy was due both to the belief that piracy was a phenomenon of the

9

Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 30 Eur. J. Int'l L.
399, 402 (2009).
10

A discussion of some of the questions which have arisen occurs infra in Section III(A).

11

Alexander Rahmonov, Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: In Search of the Solution, (2011).
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/54.
12

Timeline: Pirates, http://www.infoplease.com/world/statistics/pirates-timeline.html; (see also, Piracy Timeline –
Pirates History, http://www.famous-pirates.com/pirates-history/piracy-timeline/.
13

Dubner, supra note 2, at 4.
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past,14 and the fact that definitions of piracy such as that found in Article 101 of
UNCLOS were based on a traditional understanding of piracy, “one that
assumes that the state system works effectively and that a State can enforce its
own laws in its territorial sea.15 Notwithstanding the recent efforts to update the
piracy laws, there is and always has been a great deal of confusion as to what
the definitive definition of piracy actually is. The result is that the current legal
regimes cause confusion regarding the arrest and prosecution of suspected
pirates.16 The confusion was illustrated in in 2010 in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia over a period of 63 days. In that court, two
different judges, ruling in two different yet strikingly similar cases and ruling on
two strikingly similar motions to dismiss, reached opposite decisions while
interpreting the same law.17
On August 17, 2010, in the United States v. Said, District Court judge
Raymond A Jackson held that the “definition of piracy in the international
community is unclear,” and also that there existed a “flexible manner in which
international sources treat the definition of piracy.”18 Jackson also noted that in
14

Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 334 (1925).
Joseph P. Isanga, Troubled Waters: Combating maritime Piracy with the Rule of law Articles, 59 Am. U. L. Rev.
1267, 1273 (2010).
15

16

Rosemary Collins & Daud Hassan, Applications and Shortcomings of the Law of the Sea in Combating Piracy: A
South East Asian Perspective, 40 J. Mar. L. & Com. 89 (2009).
17

See U.S. v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (E.D. Va. 2010) (in which the defendant’s motion to dismiss was
granted, the court holding that the definition of piracy was unclear, and that according to U.S. case history, piracy
was legally defined as armed robbery at sea); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632- 633 (E.D. Va.
2010) (in which the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied, the court holding that UNCLOS provided an
adequate definitions and that acts of violence on the high seas were an element of the crime of piracy).
18

U.S. v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (E.D. Va. 2010).
4

the only case to ever directly examine the definition of piracy in the United
States Supreme Court, U.S. v Smith,19 the Court said piracy was “robbery on the
sea, and that it was sufficiently and constitutionally defined.”20 In Smith, Justice
Joseph Story wrote that, despite the fact that there existed a “diversity of
definitions…in other respects, all writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or
forcible depredations’ upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy.” 21 Jackson
interpreted this statement, along with his analysis of writers on common or
maritime law and the law of nations, as holding that piracy’s “true definition”
was robbery upon the sea.22 Jackson went on to conclude that the defendants’
alleged act of shooting a gun at a United States naval vessel did not constitute
piracy according to United States law, and thereby granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss.23
Subsequently, on October 29th, 2010, in United States v. Hassan, Justice
Mark S. Davis held that:
[T] he definition of general piracy under modern customary
international law is, at the very least, reflected in Article 15 of the 1958
High Seas Convention and Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS. Because
UNCLOS (1) contains a definition of general piracy that is, for all
practical purposes, identical to that of the High Seas Convention, (2)
has many more states parties than the High Seas Convention, and (3)
has been much more widely accepted by the international
19

U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).

20

Id. at 162.

21

Id. at 161.

22

Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559.

23

Id. at 567.
5

community than the High Seas Convention, the Court finds that the
definition of piracy in UNCLOS reflects the current state of customary
international law for purposes of interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1651.24
In holding that the definition of piracy did include acts of violence committed
on the high seas for private ends without an actual taking, Davis referenced the
famous case In re Piracy Jure Gentium,25 which examined the question of how
international law defined the act of piracy.26 In that case the Privy Council of
England determined that, while several cases referred to piracy as “robbery on
the high seas,” it was probable that they did so because the cases concerned
actual taking of vessels, not because actual taking were the threshold
requirement which defined piracy.27 Most notably, Viscount Sankey stated:
When it is sought to be contended, as it was in this case,
that armed men sailing the seas on board a vessel, without
any commission from any state, could attack and kill
everybody on board another vessel, sailing under a
national flag, without committing the crime of piracy
unless they stole, say, an article worth six-pence, their
Lordships are almost tempted to say that a little common
sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of
international law.28

24

United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632- 633 (E.D. Va. 2010).

25

In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (1934).

26

Hasan at 616-617.

27

Id. at 617.

28

In re Piracy Jure Gentium, supra note 34, at 840.

6

Davis subsequently held that the general piracy statute was not
unconstitutionally vague so as to defeat due process,29 and that the indictment
was sufficient to constitute the charges against the defendants.30
The confusion in the two recent Virginia district court cases revolved
around both the element of armed robbery and the interpretation of the phrase
“piracy as defined by the law of nations.”31 The issue was further compounded
in that it had not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the
almost two centuries that elapsed since the decision in Smith.32 Said has
subsequently been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, and now that court must “determine whether federal courts can
give credence to modern international law norms regarding piracy or whether
they must limit the definition of piracy to the international law norms of the era
when Congress enacted the original version of the piracy statute.”33 The lack of
a clear definition of piracy written into the United States Criminal Code has
prevented these cases from being swiftly dealt with. Unfortunately, the United
States is not the exception when it comes to vague or ineffective anti-piracy
legislation.

29

Id. at 640.

30

Id. at 642.

31

William Crum McKinney, United States v. Said & United States v. Hasan, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 577 (2011).

32

Id. at 578.

33

Id.

7

B. Piracy Under National Law
The United Nations Security Council noted as recently as 2010 concern
over the fact that the “domestic law of a number of States lacks provisions
criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for effective criminal
prosecution.”34 This is the basis for the contention that very few states have laws
in place that are sufficient for the prosecution of piracy.35 A request by the IMO36
was issued in 2008 for member states to submit samples of national legislation
enacted in order to “combat and punish acts of piracy and armed robbery at
sea, as well as any pertinent information on such national legislation.”37 In 2010,
the Legal Committee released its findings regarding the 40 countries plus Hong
Kong, China that had submitted samples of their legislation.38 The results were
examined and then categorized according to international provisions relating to
the repression of piracy as follows:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

34

whether the country concerned is Party to UNCLOS;
whether piracy is defined in the legislation of the
country concerned as it is defined in UNCLOS Article
101;
whether the UNCLOS definition of piracy is
effectively incorporated into national law even
though the UNCLOS definition itself is not directly

S.C. Res 1918 ¶ 13, U.N. Doc S/RES/1918 (April 27, 2010).

35

Barry Hart Dubner, On the Definition of the Crime of Sea Piracy Revisited: Customary vs. Treaty Law and the
Jurisdictional Implications Thereof, 42 J. Mar. L. & Com. 71, 98 (2011).
36

Int’l Maritime Organization, Request for Information on National Legislation on Piracy, IMO Doc. \C_L\2933
(December 23, 2008).
37

Id. at ¶ 2.

38

Int’l Maritime Organization, Piracy: Review of national Legislation, IMO Doc. \LEG\97\9.

8

(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)

(ix)
(x)
(xi)

quoted;
whether universal jurisdiction under UNCLOS Article
105 is effectively implemented in national legislation;
whether piracy is addressed by reference to the
Law of Nations, Jure Gentium;
whether piracy is addressed by reference to other
laws on crimes of violence;
whether the country concerned is Party to SUA 1988;
whether SUA offences which are complementary to
UNCLOS provisions on piracy (Article 3.1(a) and (b)
of SUA 1988) are effectively applicable to acts of
piracy, as defined in UNCLOS, under national
legislation;
whether the mandatory jurisdictional conditions
under SUA 1988, Article 6.1, are effectively
implemented in national legislation;
whether the discretionary jurisdictional conditions
under SUA 1988, Article 6.2, are effectively
implemented in national legislation; and
whether the jurisdictional condition under SUA 1988,
Article 6.4, is effectively implemented in national
legislation.

The general assessment regarding the implementation of the relevant UNCLOS
or SUA Article into State law was discouraging. The data showed that, although
31 of the 40 responding countries were party to UNCLOS, only 10 defined piracy
in their own criminal codes as it is defined in Article 101 of UNCLOS.39 The results
were similar regarding those States that were a party to SUA and the
implementation of the offenses found in Article 3 of SUA which are applicable to
piracy.40

39

Id. at ¶ 5.

40

Id.

9

C. Piracy Under International Law
i. UNCLOS
In a 1967 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Malta’s
Ambassador to the United Nations Arvid Pardo called for an “effective
international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly
defined national jurisdiction.”41 Pardo and others were concerned with a “superpower” rivalry spreading across the sea that was the cause of pollution and
instability regarding the rich potential of the sea bed.42 Pardo’s speech
occurred at a time when others also recognized that technological advances
had occurred which needed to be considered regarding the law of the sea.43
The focus of that the Conference that ensued and the resulting Convention was
centered on the uses of the sea and its resources.44 Pardo never once
mentioned piracy,45 and no material changes had been made compared to
the Article drafted at the 1958 Convention when UNCLOS was entered into
force.46
The United Nations contends that UNCLOS “provides the framework for
41

A History of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Third Conference.
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Arvid Pardo’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly, November 1, 1967,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/pardo_ga1967.pdf.
46

Geiss, supra note 4, 38-41.

10

the repression of piracy under international law, in particular in Articles 100 to
107 and 110.47 The Security Council has also stated that “international law, as
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 (“The Convention”), sets out the legal framework applicable to
combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean
activities.”48 Unfortunately, that framework provided by UNCLOS is viewed by
many commentators as being less than sufficient for the task.49 Some of the
limitations which commentators have discussed include”
(i) restricting the definition of piracy to “private” ends; (ii) the
geographical restriction of piracy to the high seas; (iii) issues
of reverse hot pursuit; (iv) the “two ship” requirement that
excludes internal seizure; and (v) the lack of a mandate for
states to adopt domestic counter-piracy laws that implement
their international commitments.50
ii. SUA
The SUA Convention does not explicitly apply to piracy, but deals with
violent actions against ships and those on board.51 The impetus behind the

47

Piracy Under International Law, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/piracy.htm.

48

S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (November 30, 2009).

49

See e.g.; J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy Off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions, 104
Am. J. Intl. L. 397, 404 (2010) (discussing jurisdictional questions related to Article 100 of UNCLOS and the
permissibility of States other than the capturing State prosecuting alleged pirates); Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime
Piracy and International Law, Crimes of War Project, Feb. 24, 2009,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/maritime-piracy-and-international-law/ (explaining that modern
international law on piracy does not cover attacks occurring within the territorial sea of a coastal state, thereby
typically rendering the international community powerless to prosecute).
50

Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law
Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 399, 416 (2011).
51

Geiss, supra note 4, at 42.

11

drafting of SUA revolved around the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985.52 The
Achille Lauro was seized by members of a faction of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, who subsequently shot a Jewish man that was confined to a
wheelchair and then threw his body overboard.53 In the aftermath, some
commentators supported the contention by the United States that the hijacking
was an act of piracy, but others did not agree with that assessment.54 This
confusion regarding the acts constituting piracy led to the consideration and
subsequent drafting of the SUA Convention.55 Although SUA was an important
step in the prosecution of terrorism, it is not thought to completely supersede
either customary law or the UNCLOS piracy provisions.56 First, SUA only applies to
ratifying States, and second, there are matters covered by customary law and
the UNCLOS piracy provisions beyond the ambit of SUA.57
III. THE PROBLEM WITH UNCLOS
A. Historical Issues with UNCLOS
As discussed supra, the language of the piracy articles of UNLCOS
has been criticized for being narrow, confusing and ambiguous.58 Part of
52

Id.

53

Malvina Halbertstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on
Maritime Safety, 82 Am. J. Int'l. L. 269, 272 (1988).
54

Id.

55

SUA, supra note

56

82 Am. J. Int'l. L. 269 at 271.

57

82 Am. J. Int'l. L. 269 at 273-274.

58

Geiss, supra note 4, at 59.
12

the issue concerns the fact that the piracy articles of UNCLOS date back
to the early 20th century.59 The bulk of the language which comprises the
piracy articles of UNCLOS were first formed during the codification efforts
undertaken by the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy in 1932 (“Harvard
Convention”).60 The work of the Harvard Draft Convention formed the
basis of the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) piracy in the 1950’s.61
The work of the ILC led to the Convention on the High Seas of 1958
(“Convention of the High Seas”)62, which ultimately provided the
language for Articles 100 to 107 of UNCLOS.63 To be precise, the piracy
provisions drafted in 1954 by the ILC were simply a translation into French
of the Harvard Convention. 64 These provisions were then incorporated as
Articles 14 to 21 in the Convention of the High Seas, which were in turn
imported into UNCLOS as Articles 100 through 107.
The main topic of the Harvard Convention regarded the “initial
significance” that piracy had in the law of nations, and pertained only to
acts of piracy on the high seas. 65 At the time there was a view that the

59

Geiss, supra note 4, at 37.

60

Geiss, supra note 4, at 38.

61
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law of nations was a law of States only. 66 The lack of any international
tribunal or other organization to administer international criminal or civil
justice against individuals coupled with the lack of any provision in the
laws of many States to punish foreigners for acts outside the State’s
jurisdiction meant that it could not “truly be said that piracy are crimes or
are offenses by the law of nations in a sense which a strict technical
interpretation look at those terms.”67 These factors were the basis of a the
fact that the only “norm” all could agree upon was that a “diversity of
opinion” was in existence that was especially remarkable” concerning; (1)
The definition of piracy in the sense of the law of the nations, (2) The
meaning and justification of the traditional assertions that piracy is an
offence or crime against law of nations, and (3) The common jurisdiction
of all states to prosecute and punish pirates.
These issues were raised throughout the 20th century and persist
today and were the basis of questions raised regarding the shortcomings
of international law in the area of piracy throughout the better portion of
the 20th century.68 These questions were raised in an attempt to engage
the international legal community in incidents occurring during those time
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periods.69 Those incidents included; (a) the bootlegging of whiskey, (b) the
work involved in the Harvard Convention, (c) the preparatory work of the
ILC, (d) the Conference on the Law of the Sea, (e) the Mayaguez
incident70 at the end of the Vietnam War, and (f) the hijacking of the
Santa Maria in 1961.71 An enumeration of the questions regarding piracy
and the year they were asked shows that they closely mirror issues still
being dealt with today:
1. Is piratical robbery at sea essentially different from
ordinary robbery on land? (1925)
2. Is the jurisdiction universal because they are hostes
humani generis, or are they said to be hostes humani
generis because the jurisdiction is universal? (1925)
3. Does the proposition state a prerequisite or a
consequence? (1925)
4. Does it describe a constituent element of the offense of
piracy or only a reprehensible quality or characteristic
which the law attributes to pirates? (1925)
5. Must piracy be committed on the high seas, or can it
also be committed in the territorial sea or in ports? (1957)
6. Must piracy be committed for private ends, or can it
also be committed by persons acting either on behalf of a
state or at least on behalf of a politically organized group
for a purpose which can reasonable by described as a
public purpose as opposed to a private purpose? (1957)
7. Should all acts of state be exempt from universal
jurisdiction? (1976)
8. Should all acts of politically organized, or similar groups,
69
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and of all individuals who are not acting for personal gain,
revenge, and so on, be excluded from the common
jurisdiction? (1976)72
The questions are very similar in content because none of the
conventions and writings that have occurred since the Harvard
Convention sufficiently responded to these issues.73 The drafters of these
conventions and writings simply dismissed piracy as an antiquated notion.
In fact, during the drafting process of the Convention on the High Seas,
the only activity reported regarding the piracy articles were “requests for
a complete deletion or a merger of the different articles on piracy.”74 This
lack of foresight, coupled with internal inconsistencies and shortcomings in
the articles themselves, place a limitation on UNCLOS’ effectiveness in
combating piracy.75
It has been noted that every increase in piracy has been
accompanied by a realization that a deficiency existed regarding the
“legal framework pertaining to piracy during earlier drafting exercises.76
Part of the problem, specifically with UNCLOS, is that UNCLOS is
“traditionally perceived to reflect a subtle balance of extensively
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negotiated compromises that is only acceptable to State parties as a
package deal.”77 This perception leads to a belief that any attempt to
modify limited elements of UNCLOS would infringe upon the balance of
the negotiated compromise and would lead to a movement to modify
elements of UNCLOS in its entirety.78 This concern allows for difficulties in
piracy prosecutions to persist because the weaknesses of the UNCLOS
piracy articles are “not where the greatest contemporary concern lies.”79
B. Article 101: Definition of Piracy
Article 101 of UNCLOS, which contains the Convention’s definition of
piracy, states:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a)

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft,
or against persons or property on board such ship
or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it
a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
77
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There are four main elements of Article 101 that have been subject to
criticism. They can be summarized as follows:
1. An illegal act involving violence, detention or
depredation
2. Occurring on the high seas
3. Committed for private ends
4. Involving two ships or aircraft80
Each one of these elements has enjoyed criticism from scholars that complain
they are too narrow and limiting because they place “severe limitations on the
types of attacks on ships that are governed by these provisions.”81 The inability of
the articles to evolve almost at all since 193282 has also led to criticisms that the
UNCLOS definition of piracy is “too narrow to include the majority of modern day
piratical acts.”83
i. An illegal act involving violence, detention or depredation
Article 101 of UNCLOS requires “illegal acts” that involves violence,
detention or depredation. The first point of vagueness which arises then is
whether or not more than one act must take place in order for Article 101 to
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apply?84 A quick review of Article 101(b) and (c) show that each refers to a
singular act, which infers that just one act will suffice.85
The second point of vagueness regards the question of whether or not
piratical acts that occur without violence are covered under Article 101. This is
problematic in situations where the pirates utilize non-violent methods such as
stealth, or merely make threats.86 Although it is possible to characterize a threat
as an act of violence, it requires a broadening of the language, something
which could be a factor in a successful defense strategy.87
This was precisely the reasoning of the Seychelles Supreme Court for
dismissing the first count against the defendants in Republic v. Houssein
Mohammed Osman & Ten Others.88 In the Draco case, the court referred to two
earlier Seychelles Supreme Court cases89 in analyzing whether the defendants
had engaged in acts of violence, detention or depredation against the Draco.90
The court distinguished the conduct of the defendants in Draco from the
conduct of the defendants in the earlier cases based on the fact that
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defendants in the earlier cases had engaged in overt violent acts directed at
the vessels, including firing “at the vessels in an attempt to intercept board and
take control of” them.91 The court held that the Draco defendants “had only
come in a speeding skiff and got turned away by the gunfire from the Draco
before or without committing any of the above overt acts.”92
Article 3 of SUA enumerates a long list of offenses which are subject to
prosecution:93
1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully
and intentionally:
a. seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or
b. performs an act of violence against a person on
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship; or
c. destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
that ship; or
d. places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is
likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship
or its cargo which endangers or is likely to en-danger
the safe navigation of that ship; or
e. destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational
facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any
such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a
ship; or
f. communicates information which he knows to be
false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a
ship; or
g. injures or kills any person, in connection with the
commission or the attempted commission of any of the
offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).
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2. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
a. attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in
paragraph 1; or
b. abets the commission of any of the offences set forth
in paragraph 1 perpetrated by any person or is
otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits
such an offence; or
c. threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided
for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical
or juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act,
to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1,
subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), if that threat is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of the ship in question.
Although SUA was specifically tailored to apply to terrorism after the Achille
Lauro incident, there are offenses listed in Article 3 that may be applied to acts
of piracy.94
Particularly relevant in regard to piracy are the prohibitions against; seizing
or exercising control over a ship by force or intimidation in 3(1)(a), performing an
act of violence against any person on board a ship if the act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship in 3(1)(b), and threatening to perform
one of these acts, if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the
ship in 3(2)(c).95 The threshold for meeting the requirement that the acts must be
likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship does not entail that the ship
be in danger of running aground or sinking to satisfy the.96 Therefore, most acts
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of piracy would be covered.97 It’s also likely that the Article 3(1)(g)prohibition
against injuring or killing any person in connection with the commission or
attempted commission of any of the offenses found in 3(1)(a) to (f) would apply
to acts of piracy.98
It’s also likely that the prohibition in Article 3(2)(a) against attempting to
commit any of the offenses set forth in Article 3(1), and the Article 3(2)(b)
prohibition against aiding and abetting the commission of any of those offenses
would apply to acts of piracy.99 However, it is important to note that aiding and
abetting an attempt to commit one of the Article 3(1) offenses is not one of the
Article 3 list of offenses.100
If the Article 3 offenses had previously been amended into Seychelles law,
it is likely that the court would have decided differently in Draco. Under such
circumstance, the attempt by the pirates in the blue skiff to seize control of the
Draco brandishing a bazooka would have satisfied Article 3(1)(a) read with
Article 3(2)(a). Similarly, Article 3(2)(b) would have applied to the individuals on
the support boat who aided and abetted that attempt.
ii. Occurring on the high seas
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According to Article 101(a)(i), In order for an event to amount to piracy,
an act must be committed on the high seas or someplace outside the
jurisdiction of any State.101 Addressing the second geographical limitation first,
the ILC has states that “a place outside the jurisdiction of any State” refers to
“an island constituting terra nullius or the shores of an unoccupied territory.”102
Article 86 defines the high seas as “all parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), in the territorial sea, or in the internal
waters of a State.”103 This limitation causes problems with acts of piracy which
occur in territorial waters of a State, or when acts of piracy occur on the high
seas, but the pirates escape to the territorial waters of a State before they can
be apprehended. Exacerbating the issue is the fact that the central provisions of
UNCLOS extended the territorial seas of a State to 12 miles.104 Although this
significantly limits the geographical location of acts defined as piracy under
UNCLOS, Article 58(2) “deems the piracy provisions, and other important
provisions to be applicable within the Exclusive Economic Zone ‘in so far as they
are not incompatible with’ Part V of UNCLOS. Part V of UNCLOS deals with the
rights and duties of coastal states and other users of the EEZ” with a focus on
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fishing and harvesting of seabed minerals.105 Thus, it is generally accepted that
the UNCLOS piracy provisions do operate within the EEZ.
The territorial waters limitation was in the specific context of the situation
off of the coast of Somalia was dealt with by the request of the Somalian
Transitional Federal Government (“STFG”) for international assistance, and the
granting by the U.N. Security Council of an express right for a period of 12
months for States to:
[E]nter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the
purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action
permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under
relevant international law; and [u]se…all necessary
means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at
sea.106
This right was further extended for an additional period of 12 months.107
Unlike Article 101 of UNCLOS’s restriction of jurisdiction to the high seas, the
scope of jurisdiction found in SUA is much broader.108 Article 4 of SUA (“Article
4”), which contains the jurisdictional limitation of the Convention, states:
1. This Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is
scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the
lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.
2. In cases where the Convention does not apply pursuant
to paragraph 1, it nevertheless applies when the offender or
105
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the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party
other than the State referred to in paragraph 1.
Although the language of this Article has also come under fire for “not being
carefully drafted and not fully expressing the intent of the drafters,”109 Article 4
has been interpreted as meaning that a State may exert jurisdiction over any of
the acts enumerated in Article 3 whether they occur “on the high seas or the
territorial sea of any State, so long as the scheduled or actual navigation is not
limited to the territorial sea of that State.”110 Moreover, Article 4(2)grants
jurisdiction if the suspected pirate is discovered “in the territory of a State other
than the State in whose waters the cabotage was first taking place.”111
iii. Committed for private ends
The language of Article 101 of UNCLOS restricts jurisdiction to acts which
are committed for private ends, and thereby excludes acts which are
committed for a non-pecuniary purpose, including acts of terrorism, or acts
committed to highlight a cause. The origins of the private ends requirement are
rooted in the Harvard Convention.112 Commentary on the Harvard Convention
indicates that the private ends requirement was drafted to “exclude acts by
insurgents seeking independence for their state – a political aim.”113 In
109
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customary international law, an attack on a vessel committed to highlight a
situation such as a struggle of a State to gain independence is a defense to
charges of piracy.114 This was especially relevant at the time of the Harvard
Convention there were many former colonial nations struggling to achieve
independence, and insurgents would utilize “maritime terrorism tactics” in that
struggle.115

This defense of piracy based in the attempt to highlight a cause becomes
especially pertinent regarding Somalians engaged in piracy. If those arrested
on suspicion of piracy argued that they acted with a political motivation, that
could provide them with “an easy excuse against any allegations of having
committed piracy.”116 Defendants could argue that they are insurgents that are
in conflict with the STFG since the STFG is involved in a non-international armed
conflict in Somalia.117 It is also reasonable to suppose that defendants might
argue that they attacked other vessels in an attempt to fight off illegal fishing
and dumping which is occurring off the coast of Somalia, or that they acted in
an attempt to make public the plight of Somalians due to the degradation of
their climate.118 In fact, some Somalian pirates have already stated this.119
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It is likely that such a defense would fail on a technicality. It is accepted
that acts are undertaken for private ends unless they are taken with State
sanction or “without the possibility to attribute private acts to a State.”120
Therefore, without any authorization from the STFG to commit acts of piracy, the
activities of Somalian nationals could not be said constitute public acts which
fall outside the ambit of the piracy definition found in UNCLOS.121 The SUA
Convention does not contain a parallel mens rea element.
iv. Involving two ships or aircraft
Because the UNCLOS piracy provisions require that two ships be involved
in an act of piracy, they do not covey jurisdiction over a person that hijacks a
ship after stowing away or gaining access to a ship and subsequently
overpowering the crew.122 Passenger takeovers, mutinies and crew-seizures of
one and the same vessel fall outside the two-ship requirement.123 Although the
two ship rule does have a positive effect in that it prevents acts of theft
committed while in port from being contemplated as piracy, historically it has
been viewed as a weakness, most notably in the case of the Achille Lauro. The
requirement itself reflects the traditional view of pirates as marauding bandits
119
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sailing the seas in order to indiscriminately plundering other vessels.124 That being
said, if this condition were to be removed, theft which occurred which a ship
was docked in port could technically be considered acts of piracy.125
v. Additional Inconsistencies With Article 101
The acts described in Article 101(b) of UNCLOS concerning voluntary
participation and those of Article 101(c) of UNCLOS which pertain to incitement
of piratical acts have been interpreted as contrary to Article 101(a) in that they
are not limited geographically to the high seas.126 Since Article 101(c) proscribes
“any act of inciting” the acts don’t need to take place aboard a pirate vessel,
and it has been argued that these acts may even take place on shore or within
a State’s territorial waters. Therefore, since States may take those into custody
that incite piracy while aboard pirate ships located in territorial waters, but may
not do the same for pirate ships which commit their acts within those same
territorial waters, persons found on the high seas that are alleged to have
facilitated piracy while located in territorial waters may be taken into custody,
while those known to have engaged in actual piracy within territorial waters
cannot be seized.127
C. Article 103: Definition Of A Pirate Ship Or Aircraft
Article 103 contains the definition of a pirate craft and states:
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A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used
for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to
in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has
been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains
under the control of the persons guilty of that act.
Article 101(a) contains no specific requirements regarding the size of the
offending and victim vessels.128 Given that the object of Part VII of UNCLOS in
which the piracy Articles are found concerns the protection of free navigation
on the high seas, it is arguable that even a small vessels and crafts such as skiffs
would be included with the definition of the word “ship.”129 The decisive criterion
for the offending ship would seem to be whether its size made it capable of
interfering with the free navigation of the victim ship on the high seas.130 The
decisive criterion for the victim ship according to UNCLOS would seem to be
that the vessel was seaworthy.131 These interpretations regarding the offending
victim vessels would then include attacks on smaller crafts such as yachts, as
well as the usage of maneuverable outboard engine driven long boats which
are effective for carrying out attacks at sea, and therefore capable of
interfering with free navigation.132
The Article 1 of SUA definition of a ship as “a vessel of any type
whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically
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supported craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft” is very broad.133 Such
a ship is also not required to fly a flag of any State that is a party to the SUA
Convention.134 Nor does it have to be “in service.”135 This latter element was
included specifically to cover ships lying in port, such as those ships that have
been hijacked and detained in Somalian ports. Conversely, Article 2(1) excludes
both any warship and any ship owned or operated by a State when being used
as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes.136
IV.

CONCLUSION
Alfred Rubin may have best captured it best when he wrote that the

treaty rules on piracy are “incomprehensible and therefore codify nothing.”137
Obviously, he was not suggesting that there were no relevant treaty rules on
piracy, but rather, that the meaning and interpretation of these treaties was so
confusing and convoluted as to strip them of all efficacy. Although the situation
in the Indian Ocean and other areas around the world has stimulated extreme
interest and action in developing international and State laws sufficient to
combat piracy. Of preeminent import is the development of a definition of
piracy that can be effectively implemented and applied in order to combat
piracy.
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The definition of piracy found in UNCLOS is rife with ambiguous language
and inconsistencies. It has been widely criticized for this reason. The UNCLOS
piracy provisions suffer primarily because they have seen almost no revision
whatsoever in the 8 decades since the language was first drafted. The definition
of piracy found in Article 101 is confusing and limiting. It is not clear whether or
not piratical acts occurring as the result of threats of violence or stealth satisfy
the element requiring violence, detention or depredation. It is also unclear
whether or not the raising of a defense based on the theory that the piratical
act was committed only to raise awareness of a situation such as the plight of
Somalians averts the satisfaction of the “private ends” element. The article also
places broad limitations on the geographic jurisdictional boundaries, and
piratical acts which are undertaken by a person who gains access to the ship by
stowing away or posing as a passenger. The implications of incorporating these
articles into Seychelles law are that these widely recognized and analyzed
deficiencies are readily available to defense attorneys in cases involving the
prosecution of pirates.
Although there is no explicit definition of piracy to be found in the SUA
Convention, the application of the SUA Articles to the crimes of piracy would
act as a worthy supplement to the UNCLOS regime. Where UNCLOS is vague in
that it includes no definition of which acts may be constituted as acts of piracy.
Article 3 of SUA provides an explicit enumeration of offenses, many of which
could be applied to acts of piracy. Furthermore, where SUA constricts jurisdiction
31

over piratical acts to the high seas and the EEZ, SUA encompasses no such
limitations. Similarly, SUA is also not burdened by the “private ends” or “two
ships” limitations found in UNCLOS, but each of these limitations does have
constructive elements.
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